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1 Introduction
Managers and industry in the eastern Gulf of Mexico commercial grouper fishery are currently craft-
ing an individual fishing quota (IFQ) management program to replace the current controlled-access
regulatory program which includes a license limitation, annual catch quotas for heavily targeted
species, per trip catch limits, minimum size limits, area/gear restrictions, and season closures (see
Amendment 29, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council).1 ,2 Market-based incentives implicit
in IFQ management promise to increase economic performance for the commercial fleet, stabilize
the economic and regulatory environment and improve safety for fishermen. Improved economic
performance is expected as the fleet is downsized and harvesting responsibilities are consolidated
onto fewer vessels, and the relatively productive vessels among the currently active reef fish fleet
(Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2007). The goal of this paper is to characterize
changes in fleet structure, eﬀort levels, and vessel-level harvesting and costs that are expected
under the IFQ management program, and to estimate the economic gains that accompany these
changes.
The conceptual approach follows work by Weninger and Waters (2003) and others.3 The em-
pirical model incorporates recent advances in the understanding of targeting behavior in multiple-
species fisheries (Singh and Weninger, 2007). Data on trip-level harvesting and annual operating
expenses for the 2005-06 fishing seasons are used to estimate a multiple species harvest cost func-
tion. The calibrated model is then used to characterize vessel-level harvesting activities, fleet size,
revenues, costs and harvest permit prices that are expected under the proposed IFQ management
program. The model also provides estimates of the cost savings from replacing the current con-
trolled access management program with IFQs.
The analysis predicts significant fleet downsizing will occur in the grouper fishery under IFQ
management. It is estimated that the accompanying economies of scale and redistribution of harvest
to productive boats will result in variable cost savings in the range of $2.226 million to $3.236 million
annually. Although more diﬃcult to quantify, additional savings from vessel maintenance costs,
docking fees, and utility expenditures are expected under the smaller IFQ-regime fleet.
1Amendment 29 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico considers the
merits of several management alternatives, including the elimination of latent permits, a buyback or buyout program,
permit endorsements, an individual fishing quota program, and an individual transferable eﬀort quota program.
2Eight major grouper species are targeted in the eastern region of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery: red, black,
gag, scamp, yellowedge, warsaw and snowy groupers, and speckled hind.
3Weninger and Waters (2003) and Weninger (forthcoming) study the potential eﬀects of adopting rights-based
managment in the northern and eastern regions of the reef fish fishery. Dupont (2000), Squires and Kirkley (1995,
1996), and Squires, Alauddin and Kirkley (1994) provide ex ante estimates of the potential gains from tradable
harvest permits. Studies examining the performance of existing programs are increasingly available, e.g., Grafton,
Squires and Fox (2000).
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The next section introduces a conceptual model of harvesting behavior and equilibrium fleet
structure in a multiple-species fishery that is managed with IFQs. Section 3 describes the data
and empirical methods used to estimate trip-level harvesting costs. Results of the estimation are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 predicts vessel harvesting activity, equilibrium fleet structure, and
revenues and costs expected in the IFQ-managed fishery. Concluding remarks follow in Section 6.
Details for the econometric estimation are presented in an Appendix.
2 Conceptual Framework
Under IFQ management, tradable harvest permits, which sum to the target total harvest for each
reef fish species, are distributed to fishermen. Target harvest levels are chosen by the fishery
manager.4 Let Hi denote the total allowable harvest for species i = 1, ...,m, and let hi denote the
quantity harvested by a representative vessel operation. With frictionless permit trading, a per
period harvest permit lease prices λi will emerge. We will assume that active vessel operations
purchase and sell permits with the goal of maximizing per-period profits, given as
π(r, w, k) = max
h≥0
{rh− C(h,w, k, x)} ;
C(h,w, k, x) is the short run harvest cost function of the harvest vector h, factor input price vector
w (e.g., fuel, bait, gear and labor), the capital endowment k (e.g., vessel, electronic equipment,
skipper skill), and a vector stock abundance indexes, x = (x1, ..., xm). Letting p denote the vector of
dockside prices, the net price for landed fish in the above expression is r = (p−λ), where λ is a vector
of harvest permit rental prices. The capital endowment k conditions the costs of harvesting fish and
thus diﬀerentiates vessel operations in terms of the harvesting cost incurred. We can index vessels
by their capital type, and rank them from lowest to highest cost, C(h,w, k1, x) ≤ C(h,w, k2, x) ≤ ....
The equilibrium fleet structure under the IFQ management program is determined by the following
conditions:
PJ∗
j=1 h
kj
i = Hi i = 1, ...,m (C1)
J∗ = argmax
J
{PJj=1 phkj − C(hkj , w, x, kj)}, (C2)
where hkj is the harvest vector and quantity of harvest permits fished by vessel with capital kj .
Conditions C1 and C2 simultaneously determine equilibrium harvest permit lease prices and
the number of harvesting operations, denoted J∗, in the IFQ-managed fishery. Condition C1 states
4Material in this section follows Weninger (forthcoming).
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that for each species the total fleet catch must equal the allowable harvest, Hi (also the total
permits issued by the manager). Condition C2 states that the J∗ active vessel operations must
attain the largest net harvesting profits, conditional on the aggregate harvest target H1, ..,Hm. C2
implies that active vessels will exhaust available economies of scale in production, and that most
cost eﬃcient operations will be active under the IFQ program. If this were not the case, gains
from permit trading would exist, which contradicts the equilibrium condition. Also notice that C2
ensures that the maximum harvesting profits or resource rent is obtained from the total allowable
harvest.5
We next turn to the problem of empirically estimating the harvest cost function C(h,w, kj , x)
and characterizing the equilibrium fleet structure in the eastern Gulf reef fish fishery.
2.1 Empirical model
Reef fish fishermen intercept multiple species on a typical fishing trip. The harvest technology
intrinsically embodies an economy of scope and produces a cost eﬃcient harvest mix that depends
on the absolute as well as the relative abundance of various reef fish species in the sea. Following
Singh and Weninger (2007), we will assume that targeting activity entails additional costs that reef
fish fishermen, in general, will prefer to avoid. Costly targeting can however be part of a profit
maximizing harvesting strategy, if for example, species-specific prices vary and/or harvest permits
are scarce for some reef fish species. We next introduce a functional form that can represent costly
targeting behavior.
Let θi = hih1+...+hM denote the quantity share of species i in the total harvest. The share of the
species i stock on the fishing ground is denoted ϕi =
xi
x1+...+xM
. Trip-level expenses are assumed
to take the following form:
c(h,w, k, x) =
∙
1 +
1
2
PM
i=1 γi (θi − ϕi)
2
¸
· g(w, h, k|β). (1)
The first bracketed term is the targeting component. The second term, g(w, h, k|β), captures
non-targeting costs.
The targeting component captures trip expenses that arise due to the targeting activities of
the vessel. The model assumes there exists a particular harvest mix θ = ϕ that can be har-
vested without costly targeting. If the vessel skipper chooses this particular harvest mix, the term
1
2
Pm
i=1 γi (θi − ϕi)
2 = 0. Since no targeting activities are required, no added costs are incurred,
and the trip costs are given by g(w,h, k|β). We assume that g(w, h, k|β) is an increasing and convex
5A dynamic bioeconomic model would identify the resource rent maximizing values for H1, ..., Hm (see Singh and
Weninger, 2007).
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function of harvest h, an increasing and concave function of w and a non-increasing function of
capital k. Note that if a fisherman chooses a harvest mix that diﬀers from the cost-minimizing mix,
i.e., θi 6= ϕi, the first right-hand term will exceed unity and costs will increase.
The unknown parameters of the targeting component include γi = (γ1, ..., γm) and the vector
of stock shares, ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕm). The non-target component parameter vector is β. In principle
data on species-specific stock abundance could be used, eliminating the need to estimate ϕ. Data
limitations prevented such an approach here.6
While it is costly to target a species mix that diﬀers from ϕ, targeting can be part of a profit
maximizing fishing strategy. We assume that vessel skippers target a vector h that maximizes the
trip profits. In deriving an expression for trip profits it is important to consider the role of the crew
share system in the fishery. It is usually the case in commercial fisheries that the vessel captain
and crew are paid a share of the trip revenues, or in some cases, a share of trip variable profits,
i.e., revenue less some components of trip expenses. Captain and crew wages typically represent
a significant component of the net revenues of a trip, and the method of labor remuneration has
implications for profit maximizing harvest choices, which we assume are made by the vessel skipper
(McConnell and Price, 2006). We will denote the residual share of trip revenue and variable costs
that accrue to the vessel skipper as ηr and ηvc, respectively. The skipper’s residual profits after
labor costs are given as
max
h
©
ηrp
0h− ηvcc(w, h, k, x)
ª
.
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions for profit maximization are
ηpi = ci(w, h, k, x), , i = 1, ...,m, (2)
where η = ηr/ηvc, and ci(w, h, k, x) = ∂c(w, h, k, x)/∂hi denotes the marginal cost of harvesting
species i fish. Hereafter, we will interpret and refer to the parameter η = ηr/ηvc as the skipper
residual profit parameter.
The trip level cost function in equation 1 and the first order necessary conditions in equation 2
form the basis for estimation of the unknown parameters (γ, ϕ, β) and the skipper residual profit
parameter, η. The next section describes the data and estimation procedure.
6Standard models of stock abundance utilize commercial catch data to varying degrees. It would seem unwise to
use an estimate of abundance derived from commercial harvesting activity data to analyze the costs of harvesting
fish.
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3 Fishery Background and Data
The reef fish fishery in the eastern Gulf of Mexico is a complex of bottom-dwelling species consisting
of red, black, yellowedge, gag, warsaw and other species of groupers, amberjacks, triggerfish, porgies,
tilefish, and red, vermilion and other snapper species. The Gulf reef fish fishery extends throughout
the Gulf of Mexico from Texas to the Florida Keys. The analysis in this paper will focus on the
eastern region of the fishery from Panama City, Florida east and south along the Florida coast to
the Florida Keys. Grouper species are the main target species in this region of the fishery.7 Vertical
hook and line and longline fishing gear are the two main gear types used.
Current management measures in the fishery include a combination of permit moratorium,
total quotas which are enforced with seasonal closures, minimum size limits and trip limits. The
commercial shallow water grouper total allowable catch (TAC) is set at 8.80 million pounds gutted
weight. Red grouper, which is a member of the shallow water species group has a separate TAC
of 5.31 million pounds (gutted weight). These quotas are enforced with seasonal closures that are
enacted when either the shallow water or the red grouper TAC is met. Existing minimum size limits
are set at 24 inches for black and gag grouper, 20 inches for yellowfin and red grouper, and 16 inches
for scamp. The fishery is closed for one month (February 15 through March 15). An aggregate trip
limit of 6,000 pounds of shallow water and deep water groupers combined was introduced for the
2006 fishing season.
The commercial deepwater grouper TAC is currently set as 1.02 million pounds. The commercial
tilefish TAC is currently set at 440,000 pounds. There are no size limits for deepwater grouper
species or tilefish since these fish do not survive retrieval from the depths in which they are caught.
Amendment 30B to the Reef Fish Management Plan proposes a separate TAC for gag grouper.
The implications of the gag quota are discussed further in Section 5.
Amendment 29 to the Reef Fish Fisheries Management Plan identifies alternative IFQ program
designs. Each allocates shares of total species-specific target quotas, which are determined by the
management authority. The pounds of fish that can be legally landed by a fishermen are then
determined as the shares owned times the total quota. Designs diﬀer with regard to the coarseness
of species groups. For example, one proposed design allocates harvest shares for: (i) red grouper,
(ii) gag grouper, (iii) other shallow water groupers including red hind, shallow water scamp, black,
yellowmouth, and yellowfin grouper, (iv) deepwater groupers, including yellowedge grouper, warsaw
grouper, snowy grouper, misty grouper, deepwater scamp, and speckled hind, and (v) tilefish. A
7Weninger and Waters (2003) analyze the benefits of adopting a rights-based management program in the northern
Gulf reef fish fishery using standard non-parametric (data envelopment analysis) methods.
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second proposal would allocate shares for (i) all shallow water groupers, (ii) all deepwater groupers
and (iii) tilefish. A third proposal would allocate shares for (i) all groupers and (ii) tilefish.
3.1 Data
The data used in this study are from the National Marine Fisheries Service log book reporting
system, and a survey of annual operating expenses that was conducted by the Southeast Fisheries
Science Center. Following each reef fish trip, commercial vessel operators must record the trip’s
harvest quantities by species, the gear type used on the trip, the primary area of fishing, the
number of crew on board the vessel and other trip characteristics. In 2003, a “Trip Expense &
Payment Section” was added to the logbook reporting form. The added section elicited trip revenue
by species, fuel, bait, ice, and food expenditures, along with payments to the captain and crew.
Mandatory expense and payment data collection began in 2005 for a stratified sample of the Gulf
reef fish fleet.
In summary, data available for analysis consist of standard log book data for the Gulf commercial
fleet from 2000-2006. Expense and payment data are from a stratified sample of roughly 25% of
the eligible reef and mackerel permit holders for 2005-06.
3.1.1 Eﬀort and catch data
The analysis will focus on fishing trips taken in the eastern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery, where
the bulk of the grouper species are harvested. The region extends from the Mississippi River delta
east along the Florida coast to the Florida Keys.8 The target species in the eastern Gulf region are
primarily grouper species, although a host of other reef fish species including snappers (primarily
vermilion) and non-reef fish species such as mackerel, tunas, and sharks are also harvested.
Table 1 reports 2002-06 eﬀort and landings information for the vertical line gear and the longline
gear types. Total eﬀort measures reported include the number of boats, total trips, total days at
sea (DAS) and total crew days at sea, which is calculated as the number of individuals on board the
vessel times the days spent at sea. The table includes the average DAS per trip, and the average
pounds harvested per trip on all trips for all species. Lastly, we report the total landings of deep
water groupers (DWG), shallow water groupers (SWG), snappers and other reef fish (Snp./Oth.),
and non-reef fish species (N. Reef).
8The Gulf reef fish fishery extends west along the Texas coast to Mexican waters. The primary target species in
the western or northern Gulf region is red snapper. A red snapper individual fishing quota management program
was implemnted in 2007. Analysis of the northern Gulf region is reserved for future work.
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Vertical Line Gear
Total Eﬀort Per Trip Ave. Total Landings (thous. lbs.)
Year Bts. Trips DAS Crew DAS DAS Lbs. DWG SWG Snp./Oth. N. Reef
2002 478 4,686 15,129 29,688 3.23 821 35.0 2,472.2 1,051.6 287.1
2003 448 4,610 14,360 27,785 3.12 684 88.1 1,841.9 974.3 249.5
2004 436 4,337 13,355 26,021 3.08 806 75.7 2,019.6 1,066.9 333.7
2005 416 3,767 11,935 23,103 3.17 840 40.8 1,865.0 999.7 259.2
2006 370 3,488 12,490 23,986 3.58 837 79.0 1,622.2 941.4 275.3
Longline Gear
Total Eﬀort Per Trip Ave. Total Landings (thous. lbs.)
Year Bts. Trips DAS Crew DAS DAS Lbs. DWG SWG Snp./Oth. N. Reef
2002 141 1,343 11,090 33,782 8.26 5,024.3 482.5 4,966.9 207.6 1,090.6
2003 139 1,502 12,298 38,069 8.19 4,877.4 798.8 4,845.1 318.0 1,364.0
2004 145 1,463 11,977 37,194 8.19 5,098.0 942.8 5,219.7 355.1 940.9
2005 132 1,320 9,519 29,292 7.21 4,695.4 785.8 4,358.4 250.5 803.3
2006 119 1,439 11,101 34,201 7.74 4,282.7 689.7 3,950.3 369.2 1,153.6
Table 1: Eastern Gulf Region Eﬀort and Landings: 2002-06. DAS denotes days at sea;
Lbs. are denoted in round weight; DWG is deep water groupers; SWG is shallow
water groupers; Snp./Oth. is snappers and other reef fish species; N. Reef is
non-reef fish species. Data are from the NMFS log book reporting system.
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The vertical line gear summary statistics indicate a decline in the number of participating boats,
total trips, and crew DAS during the 2002-05 data period. This trend is not apparent in the 2006
data. The cause of the decline in the vertical line eﬀort is diﬃcult to determine. Declining eﬀort
is consistent with a tightening of commercial harvest regulations during the data period and/or
declining reef fish stock abundance. Other factors such as increased fuel prices may also play a role.
An average vertical line trip lasts 3 to 3.5 days during which time vessels harvest an average of
800-840 total pounds of fish. It should be noted that the fleet average catch per trip masks the fact
that a highliner vertical line boat will typically harvest 3,000-5,000 pounds on a trip. The average
in the table is significantly lower because a large segment of the vertical line fleet are part time
vessels that harvest small quantities of fish both at the trip level and on an annual basis.
Total landings on vertical line fishing trips are reported in the last four columns of Table 1.
Shallow water groupers are the main target species for vertical line gear although snappers and other
reef fish are also important. Non-reef fish species and deep water groupers make up considerably
smaller shares of the total harvest for the vertical line gear fleet.
Turning to the longline gear we see a similar downward trend in the total eﬀort measures during
the 2002-05 period, with a small increase in each eﬀort measure in 2006. A smaller number of boats
employ longline gear than vertical line gear, and fewer longline trips were taken during the data
period.
An average longline vessel is larger (45.4 feet) than an average vertical line boat (35.6 feet),
takes longer trips (typically 7 to over 8 days at sea) and employs a larger crew. On average, longline
boats carry 2.97 individuals (captain plus crew), whereas vertical line boats carry 2.12 individuals.
Longer trips with a larger crew translate into a per trip harvest that is considerably larger than
on a vertical line trip. It is not unusual for a highliner longline gear boat to land 8,000 to 10,000
pounds on a trip. The fleetwide harvest by longline gear vessels is larger for all species groups
except the snapper and other reef fish (Snp./Oth.) category.
The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that the species mix at the aggregate level diﬀers
across the two gear types. An investigation of trip-level harvesting activity further demonstrates
these diﬀerences. Focusing on the 2006 harvest season (results for 2002-2005 are very similar, with
no trends indicated during the period) finds that harvest shares on an average vertical line gear
trip include 1.8% deep water groupers, 46.7% shallow water groupers, 39.1% snappers and other
reef fish, and 12.4% non-reef fish species. On an average longline trip, the catch includes a larger
share of deep water groupers (9.5%), shallow water groupers (62.8%) and non-reef fish (22.2%),
and a smaller share of snappers and other reef fish species (5.5%).
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Vertical Line Gear
Year Obs. Rev. Costs Fuela Bait Ice Labor
2005 1,731 $2,974 $1,514 24.96% 9.31% 5.54% 61.19%
2006 1,560 3,192 1,825 24.77 8.86 6.00 60.37
Longline Gear
Year Obs. Rev. Var. cost Fuela Bait Ice Labor
2005 475 $9,440 $5,478 18.07% 15.10% 5.23% 61.60%
2006 658 9,606 5,793 19.52 14.83 4.23 61.42
Table 2: Per Trip Harvest, Revenue and Variable Cost. Source: NMFS log book
reporting system. a - reported values are percentage shares of trip expense.
Summarizing the fishery-wide trends, we find that total participating vessels (both gear types)
fell from 592 in 2002 to 469 in 2006. Total trips fell by 18.3% from 6,029 in 2002 to 4,927 in 2006.
Total days at sea fell by 10% during the same period.9 Combined landings across the two gear
types indicate that the aggregate harvest of deep water groupers, along with snappers and other
species, increased. Aggregate shallow water grouper landings declined by roughly 25%, whereas
the non-reef fish harvest varied with no apparent trend.
3.1.2 Trip revenue and expenses
Log book data indicate that 10,014 trips landed reef fish in the eastern Gulf region during the 2005-
06 harvest seasons. Of these, 3,432 (34.3%) have complete trip expense information. Trip expense
data were examined for possible reporting errors. This procedure identified 35 observations for
which the reported variable costs per landed pound was an order of magnitude above the dockside
price, or considerably below the reported expenses for remaining observations. There were 23 trips
that reported crew sizes in excess of five, ten trips reported landings in excess of 15,000 pounds,
and two trips that reported variable costs in excess of $10,000. These trips were deemed non-
representative and were dropped. There are 3,362 observations available for the cost analysis. Of
these, 2,229 observations are vertical line trips taken by 238 unique vessels. The remaining 1,401
observations are longline gear trips taken by 101 unique vessels.
Table 2 summarizes the number observations, average revenue and (variable) costs per trip,
along with a percentage breakdown for the main trip expense categories: fuel, bait, ice and labor.
9Concerns of declining stock levels for some grouper species and tighter harvesting restrictions imposed in 2005
may explain this trend, and particularly the sharp drop in eﬀort between 2004 and 2005.
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Log book data forms record crew shares (in dollars), the number of crew on board, and the days
at sea for the trip. This data exhibited unreasonable variation in the wages paid to captain and
crew members, per day at sea. We suspect this variation is due to inconsistencies in reporting of
crew payments. Further examination indicates that in some cases a combined skipper and boat
share was recorded in the share field when the owner of the vessel was also the skipper for the trip.
In other cases, the boat share was separated from the share paid to the captain and crew. These
anomalies confound the actual wages paid to captain and crew labor. Therefore, labor expenses
in Table 2 are calculated as the median reported wage per day at sea (during the year the trip is
taken) times the total days at sea, times the number of crew plus the skipper on board the vessel.
The labor wage is assumed to represent the cost of labor if employed in its next highest value use.
Sample average revenue per trip for vertical line gear vessels is roughly $3,000 and trip variable
costs are about half of revenue. Labor for the captain and crew make up the largest share of
trip costs exceeding 60%. Fuel represents the next highest cost category at roughly 25% of trip
expenses. Ice and bait comprise smaller shares of trip expenses.
As noted above, longline trips are typically longer, taken by larger vessels with a larger crew.
Sample average per trip revenue for longline gear trips is roughly three times higher than for vertical
line gear trips. Trip expenses are also higher ranging on average between 58-60% of trip revenue.
The average share of labor expense on a longline trip is very similar to a vertical line trip. Fuel
expenses on average comprise a smaller share of trip costs, whereas bait makes up a larger share
of trip expenses for longline gear trips.
3.2 Econometric estimation
Model tractability requires that individual reef fish species be aggregated into output groups. Out-
put groups in this study are formed based on similarity in harvesting practices, e.g., fishing loca-
tions, depths, bait, and capture methods used to harvest the diﬀerent species within each group.
To the extent possible, output groupings mirror the proposed IFQ program design as described in
Amendment 29. Harvested quantities within each output category are aggregated linearly. The ag-
gregation procedure assumes that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen
independently of the mix of species within each output category. The harvest technology is thus
assumed to exhibit weak output separability. Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of trans-
formation among harvested species within each output group.10 The output categories include:
10These assumptions are consistent with fishing practices as described to us by grouper fishermen. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that output aggregation could bias the results that follow.
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(i) deepwater groupers and tilefish11, (ii) red grouper, (iii) gag grouper, (iv) other shallow water
groupers; (v) snapper species, (vi) other reef fish, and (vii) non-reef fish (migratory pelagics, tunas,
sharks, crustaceans).
To estimate the trip-level cost function in equation 1, we require a proxy for short run fixed
capital k and a functional form for the non-target component g(w, h, k|β). We wish to control for
diﬀerences in short run fixed factors across vessel operations in our data. Such factors may include
services provided by the vessel, engine and electronic equipment, and labor provided by the captain
and crew. A commonly used proxy for capital is vessel size which is typically measured as length
or total water displacement of the hull. Vessel characteristics are not recorded in the log book
data base. We were able to match vessel length data obtained from the survey of annual operating
expenses to 81.6% of the vertical line trips and 88.7% of longline trips. To avoid dropping further
observations from the regression analysis we instead use the number of crew (including the captain)
on board the vessel to proxy for the short run fixed factors. Crew size is clearly an important factor
of production which is not easily adjusted at the trip level due to the fixed number of berths on
board. We find further that crew size and vessel length are strongly correlated.
The functional form for the non-target component g(w, h, k|β) is assumed quadratic in harvest
and crew size (details are presented in an Appendix). The harvest vector h is entered linearly and
quadratically, as is the crew size. A crew-harvest cross term, crew ·h, is added to capture the eﬀect
of larger crew size on the unit cost of harvesting reef fish. The fuel price is entered linearly (a
quadratic specification was rejected).12 A dummy variable for trips taken during the 2005 fishing
season is included.
Lastly, the total number of fishing trips taken by each vessel during each year is inserted to
proxy for diﬀerences in harvesting eﬃciency across vessels. It is reasonable to suspect that vessel
operations that take more trips per year are more familiar with the location of highly productive
fishing sites and/or employ more skilled crew than do part time boats. Correspondingly, the prior
expectation is that trip costs are a declining function of the total annual trips taken by the vessel.
11Creating a separate tilefish output category violated data confidentiality requirements. Tilefish are combined
with deepwater groupers because they are harvested with similar gear, often at similar depths.
12The data include bait expenses only. Since bait is heterogenous and bait types are not recorded, a bait price
could not be constructed. Similarly, the price for ice is not reported. These omissions are not likely to detract from
the analysis as it is reasonable to assume that bait and ice use is proportional to harvest, and that input substitution
possiblities are small or nill. Moreover, bait and ice are small components of trip expenses.
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DWG
i = 1
Red Grp
i = 2
Gag Grp
i = 3
Oth. Grp
i = 4
Snap
i = 5
Oth Reef
i = 6
N. Reef
i = 7
bγi 0.106(0.027) 0.018(0.003) 0.088(0.006) 0.081(0.008) 0.033(0.005) 0.028(0.006) 0.038(0.005)bϕi 0.089(0.018) 0.130(0.030) 0.059(0.010) 0.075(0.012) 0.297(0.024) 0.284(0.027) 0.066(0.017)
θi 0.013 0.281 0.169 0.062 0.329 0.111 0.035
pi 1.950 2.228 2.752 2.718 2.319 1.024 1.315
ci 0.553 0.335 0.316 0.445 0.316 0.235 0.225
pi − ci 1.397 1.893 2.436 2.273 2.004 0.790 1.092
Table 3: Target Component Results: Vertical Line Gear. DWG is deepwater
groupers and tilefish; Red, Gag and Oth Grp denotes red, gag and other grouper
species, respectively; Oth Reef is all other reef fish and N Reef is non reef
fish. Standard errors in parentheses.
4 Results
The parameters of the trip-level cost function are estimated using feasible generalized non-linear
least squares (see Judge et al., 1985, Chapter 12). Separate parameters are estimated for vertical
line and longline gear types. With few exceptions, the parameter estimates have the expected sign
and low standard error. A detailed explanation of the econometric estimation procedure, parameter
estimates and standard errors are reported in an Appendix. The results are summarized next.
4.1 Vertical line gear costs
Table 3 reports results for the targeting component of trip-level variable costs; vertical line gear is
considered first. Included in the table are the sample average harvest shares, denoted θi, average
dockside prices, pi, the sample average of the estimated marginal costs, ci, and the sample average
marginal variable profit, pi − ci. It should be noted that trip labor costs are not included in trip
expenses and thus the marginal return pi− ci represents the incremental fuel, ice and bait expense
required to harvest an additional unit (pound) of output group i fish.
Sample average catch shares for vertical line trips indicate that, by weight, red grouper and
snappers comprise the largest shares of the average trip catch, at 28.1% and 32.9%, respectively.
Gag grouper makes up an average of 16.9% of the trip catch and other reef fish species (denoted
Oth. Reef) comprise 11.1%. Deep water groupers, other groupers, other reef fish and non-reef fish
comprise smaller shares of the average trip catch.
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6 Trip Vessel 20 Trip Vessel
Crew Size Crew Size
Lbs/Trip 1 2 3 1 2 3
2,000 $0.85 $0.86 $0.85 $0.78 $0.79 $0.78
2,500 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.73
3,000 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.72
3,500 0.90 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.72
4,000 0.98 0.91 0.83 0.87 0.81 0.73
Table 4: Ray Average Variable Costs: Vertical Line Gear
Recall that the parameter ϕi represents the species i harvest share at which the targeting
cost component attains its lowest value. Comparing the estimates of bϕ1, ..., bϕ7 to sample average
harvest shares θ1, ..., θ7 illustrates targeting behavior by sample vertical line vessels. Results find
that the sample average share for red grouper, gag grouper and snapper species are each above
their minimum target cost counterparts, i.e., θi > bϕi for i = 2, 3, and 5. Sample average shares
for the remaining species groups fall below the minimum target cost share counterparts. These
findings suggest that vertical line fishermen incur costs to target red grouper, gag grouper and
snapper species, and/or incur costs to avoid deepwater groupers, other groupers, other reef fish and
non-reef fish. This targeting pattern is consistent with feedback from industry and managers and,
with the exception of the other grouper species, is consistent with the relative dockside prices and
estimated marginal net returns. All else equal, we would expect vertical line fishermen to target
higher priced species and take eﬀorts to avoid lower priced species. Notice, for example, the sharp
diﬀerence between harvest shares and minimum target share for gag grouper θ3 = 0.169 versusbϕ3 = 0.059. The result suggests that eﬀorts are taken to seek out gag, which is not surprising
given its relatively high dockside price. On the contrary, θ6 = 0.111 is smaller than bϕ6 = 0.284; the
result suggests skippers take actions to avoid other reef fish species, which have the lowest average
dockside price.
The estimate of the skipper residual profit parameter η is 0.132 (with estimated standard error
0.001). This result indicates that vertical line gear skippers are the residual claimant of 13.2% of
trip variable profits. This finding is in line with the skipper shares reported in our data.
Parameter estimates and standard errors for the non-target component of trip costs are reported
in an Appendix. We summarize the results by reporting fitted trip expenses at various harvest levels,
crew sizes, and number of trips taken per year.
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Table 4 reports the estimated ray average variable cost (RAVC) for vertical line gear fishing
trips.13 Reported values are obtained by evaluating fitted costs under the final parameter estimates.
We then add an estimate of the labor expenses for the trip. Labor expenses are calculated as the
median crew wage per day reported in the 2006 data ($112 for vertical line trips) times the predicted
trip length.14 All cost estimates assume that harvest shares are equal to the average harvest shares
reported in Table 3.
RAVC estimates are reported for a range of total trip pounds and varying crew sizes. To
illustrate the extent of cost ineﬃciency in the data we report RAVC estimates for a part time and
an active vessel. The part time vessel is assumed to take 6 trips per year while the active vessel
takes 20 trips per year. These trip numbers represent the range appearing in the data. Total
pounds per trip considered in the table are representative for an active vertical line boat. Crew
sizes ranging from 1-3 are also representative of the sample vertical line gear data.
The results in Table 4 indicate that for a fixed crew size, RAVC is U-shaped with increasing
returns to scale at harvest levels between 2,000-2,500 pounds per trip, and decreasing returns at
a harvest between 3,500 and 4,000 pounds per trip. The harvest at which returns to scale are
exhausted increases with crew size. With a single crew member, RAVC is lowest at 2,500 pounds
per trip, whereas with a crew of three, RAVC is lowest between 3,000-3,500 pounds per trip. Notice
that the cost estimates are only moderately sensitive to crew size, e.g., minimum RAVC varies by
$0.03 from $0.83 with a single crew member to $0.80 for a vessel with a three person crew.
Comparing results for the 6- and the 20-trip per year vessels provides an indication of measured
cost eﬃciency in the data. The comparison also suggests the pure eﬃciency gains are likely under
an IFQ management program, as eﬃcient vessels acquire quota from ineﬃcient (part time) vessel
operations. Note that lowest RAVC for the 6-trip/yr vessel is in the range of $0.83-$0.85, whereas
RAVC for the 20-trip/yr boat is in the range of $0.72-$0.75. The cost saving is roughly 13% of trip
expenses.
4.1.1 Cost eﬃciency: vertical line gear
The model can be used to more formally assess the cost eﬃciency in the sample data. We consider
the following scenario. The 2005-06 sample includes 3,291 vertical line trips taken by 286 distinct
vessels. These vessels harvested over 2 million pounds of reef fish, spent roughly 7,000 days at sea
13The concept of ray average costs and multiple output cost technologies are explained thoroughly in Baumol et
al. (1982).
14Trip length varies with total harvest and crew size. Regression analysis is used to estimate this relationship.
The per-crew labor expense is calculated as the predicted trip length (a polynomial function of crew size and total
harvested pounds) times the median daily wage.
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Total Lbs. Bts. Trips DAS Crew DAS RAVC Var. Cost
2005 2.400m
35
(234)
701
(1, 731)
4, 800
(6, 946)
9, 600
(15, 455)
$0.65
($0.73)
$1.552m
($1.753m)
2006 2.148m
28
(196)
568
(1, 560)
3, 890
(7, 133)
7, 780
(15, 318)
$0.75
($0.90)
$1.612m
($1.929m)
Table 5: Ray Average Variable Costs: Vertical Line Gear. Results assume a 2-member
crew on vessel that takes 30 trips per year.
and allocated over 15,000 crew days at sea in each of the data years. The empirical model can
be used to calculate the expenses for fuel, labor, ice and bait, days at sea, and crew days at sea
that would be required on a scale and technically eﬃcient harvesting operation. Specifically, we
calculate the trip variable costs and associated eﬀort required to harvest the 2005-06 sample reef
fish catch on a two crew member vertical line boat which lands on average 3,000 pounds per trip
and takes 20 trips per year. A fleet that is comprised of these representative vessel types will be
referred to as the cost eﬃcient fleet structure. The cost and eﬀort that is predicted under the cost
eﬃcient fleet structure is then compared to the actual cost and eﬀort incurred by sample vertical
line vessels. This comparison illustrates the extent of the harvesting cost ineﬃciency in the sample
data, and importantly, provides a measure of the variable cost savings and eﬀort reductions that
are expected to emerge under an IFQ management program.
Consider the results for the 2005 harvest season that are reported in the first row of Table
5. Sample vessels harvested a total of 2.400 million pounds of reef fish in 2005. If this same
quantity was harvested by the cost eﬃcient fleet structure as defined above, the fleet would consist
of 35 vessels, and 701 trips would be required to land the same quantity taken by sample vessels.
Actual eﬀort and costs incurred by vertical line sample vessels are reported in parentheses. The
2005 sample includes 234 vessels that took more than double the number of trips, at 1,731, and
spent considerably more days and crew days at sea. The RAVC attained by the cost eﬃcient fleet
structure is estimated at $0.65, compared to the sample RAVC of $0.73 (a 12.3% increase in variable
costs). Variable costs savings under the cost eﬃcient fleet are estimated at $201,000 in 2005.
The results reported for 2006 show a similar pattern. Observe that estimated cost savings are
higher at $317,000 despite the fact that less fish was harvested on sample vertical line trips in 2006.
This finding is consistent with more stringent catch limits and additional seasonal closures during
the 2006 season. Higher fuel prices in 2006 ($2.45 per gallon versus $2.11 in 2005) also plays a role,
i.e., cost savings arise from lower fuel consumption under the cost eﬃcient fleet with the estimated
cost diﬀerence being proportional to the fuel price.
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DWG
i = 1
Red Grp
i = 2
Gag Grp
i = 3
Oth. Grp
i = 4
Snap
i = 5
Oth Reef
i = 6
N. Reef
i = 7bγi 0.007(0.013) 0.005(0.014) 0.344(0.015) 0.239(0.018) 0.237(0.009) 0.497(0.039) 0.011(0.022)bϕi 0.158(0.956) 0.375(0.876) 0.003(0.022) 0.208(0.029) 0.094(0.018) 0.141(0.073) 0.022(0.497)
θi 0.141 0.458 0.070 0.047 0.043 0.018 0.222
pi 2.163 2.275 2.811 2.770 2.203 0.951 1.088
ci 0.366 0.263 0.109 0.582 0.276 0.362 0.061
pi − ci 1.796 2.012 2.702 2.188 1.926 0.589 1.027
Table 6: Targeting Component Results: Long Line Gear. DWG is deepwater
groupers and tilefish; Red, Gag and Oth Grp denotes red, gag and other grouper
species, respectively; Oth Reef is all other reef fish and N Reef is non reef
fish. Standard errors are in parentheses.
4.2 Longline gear costs
Table 6 reports targeting cost component results for longline gear trips. Included in the table are
sample average harvest shares, θi, average dockside prices, pi, sample average marginal costs, ci,
and the sample average profit margin, pi − ci (marginal costs are estimated values).
By weight, red grouper and non-reef fish species comprise the largest shares of longline trip
catch at 45.8% and 22.2%, respectively. Deep water groupers make up 14.1%. Gag, other groupers,
snappers and other reef fish comprise smaller shares of longline trip harvest.
Comparing estimates of bϕi and sample average harvest shares θi, we see that longline fishermen
follow diﬀerent targeting patterns than vertical line fishermen (restrictions on fishing areas for
longline gear provides one explanation). Notice that with the exception of non-reef fish species
there appears to be little targeting activity indicated within the sample of longline gear trips. For
the most part, sample average harvest shares fall close to the target cost minimizing values, bϕi
(again with the exception of non-reef fish species). An explanation for the finding of less targeting
behavior–one that is congruent with industry feedback and intuition–is that targeting is more
costly with longline gear than with vertical line gear. Longline gear distributes baited hooks over
a much larger area than vertical line gear and thus is likely to intercept a wider range of reef fish
species. Notice that estimated values of the bγi parameters, which capture the rate of cost increase
as harvest shares diverge from (bϕ1, ..., bϕ7), are generally larger for longline gear than for vertical
line gear (Table 3). The implication being that trip costs rise sharply when a longline skipper
attempts to adjust the harvest mix away from the mix implied by bϕ.
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6 Trip Vessel 16 Trip Vessel
Crew Size Crew Size
Lbs/Trip 2 3 4 2 3 4
4,000 $0.71 $0.78 $0.86 $0.70 $0.77 $0.85
6,000 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.68
8,000 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.60
10,000 0.66 0.61 0.56 0.65 0.60 0.55
Table 7: Ray Average Variable Costs: Long Line Gear .
The estimate of the skipper residual profit parameter is η = 0.091 with estimated standard
error 0.0004. The results indicate that longline skippers are the residual claimant of 9.1% of trip
variable profits. This finding is in line with the skipper shares reported in our data.
Table 7 summarizes the structure of the longline trip variable cost function. The table reports
RAVC evaluated at the sample harvest mix over the range of total harvested pounds observed in the
data (again by active vessels in the longline fleet). Results are reported for crew sizes ranging from
two-four which is representative of longline gear trips, and compares costs for a 6- and a 16-trip
per year vessel. Diﬀerences in the assumed number of trips per year illustrate the cost eﬃciency
across relatively inactive and active vessels.
For a crew size of two, we see that RAVC is U-shaped with a minimum occurring at 8,000
pounds per trip. For crew sizes of three and four, RAVC falls over the range of total harvested
pounds reported in the table. This result suggests that longline gear vessels operate in a region of
increasing returns to scale (at the trip level) over the range of harvest levels typical in our data.
The implication is that average costs per landed pound would fall if trip harvest increased. This
finding is explained by the 6,000 pound per-trip catch limit regulations for grouper species that
was imposed during 2005-06. Examination of historical logbook data provides further evidence
that recent regulations have impacted longline harvesting activity. From Table 1 in Section 3 we
see that average days at sea on longline trips and average pounds per trip fell by 11.9% and 7.9%,
respectively, in 2005, the year that per-trip catch limits were introduced.15 This evidence, while
not conclusive, suggests that regulations may be responsible for the longline gear scale ineﬃciency
indicated in the sample data. Lastly, notice that the cost diﬀerences across active and inactive
vessels amounts to roughly $0.01 per pound, which suggests small levels of cost ineﬃciency in the
15Results in Table 1 suggest that per-trip catch limits did not have the same eﬀect on vertical line gear trips. It is
likely that the 6,000 pound per trip limit did not bind for vertical line gear trips.
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Total Lbs. Bts. Trips DAS Crew DAS RAVC Var. cost
2005 2.773m
23
(78)
367
(592)
3, 491
(4, 231)
10, 472
(13, 219)
$0.58
($0.66)
$1.621m
($1.825m)
2006 3.660m
29
(74)
458
(809)
4, 358
(6, 332)
13, 075
(19, 204)
$0.60
($0.72)
$2.211m
($2.642m)
Table 8: Ray Average Variable Costs: Long Line Gear .
longline data.
4.2.1 Cost eﬃciency: longline gear
Cost eﬃciency for longline sample vessels is analyzed following the same approach used for vertical
line trips. The 2005-06 sample includes 1,401 longline trips taken by 101 diﬀerent vessels. Data
indicate that 2.773 million pounds were harvested in 2005 and that 3.660 millions pounds were
harvested in 2006. The total eﬀort allocated on sample longline trips is reported in parentheses in
Table 7.
The fitted empirical model is used to predict expenses for fuel, labor, ice and bait, days at sea,
and crew days at sea that would be required if the 2005-06 longline sample catch was harvested by
scale and technically eﬃcient harvesting operations. We calculate trip costs and associated eﬀort
incurred on a three-crew longline vessel that harvests an average of 8,000 pounds per trip and takes
16 trips per year. As above, this exercise measures the extent of the harvesting ineﬃciency in the
sample data and the variable cost savings and eﬀort reductions that are available under a cost
eﬃcient fleet structure. Because this fleet structure is expected to emerge under the proposed IFQ
management program, the results provide an indication of the benefits (cost savings) that will arise
under new management.
Consider the 2005 results in Table 8. Sample vessels harvested 2.773 million pounds of reef fish
in 2005. If this same catch were harvested by the cost eﬃcient fleet structure, the fleet would consist
of 23 boats and 367 trips would be required. Actual eﬀort and costs for sample longline vessels (in
parentheses) indicate that 78 vessels participated in 2005 and that 592 trips were required. Sample
vessels spent more days at sea and more crew days at sea than would be required under the cost
eﬃcient fleet.
RAVC attained by the cost eﬃcient fleet structure is estimated at $0.58 in 2005. In comparison,
the sample RAVC is estimated at $0.66. Results indicate that a variable costs savings of $204,000
would be obtained under the cost eﬃcient fleet structure in 2005.
19
The results reported for 2006 are similar. Under the cost eﬃcient fleet structure, fewer vessels
and less eﬀort would be required to harvest the 2006 sample catch; the results suggest total variable
cost would fall by $431,000 in 2006.
A final observation is that harvesting economies of scale generate the bulk of the cost savings
that are predicted under the eﬃcient longline fleet structure. Earlier results indicate that cost
eﬃciency gains for longline gear are small at $0.01 per pound. This finding diﬀers from the vertical
line gear results where cost eﬃciency gains are more important.
4.2.2 Expenses for maintenance, gear, mooring and utilities
To this point the analysis has focused on trip-level expenses only. We next consider annual operating
expenses for reef fish vessels.16
A National Marine Fisheries Service survey gathered annual operating expense data. Gulf reef
fish fishermen were asked to report vessel repair and maintenance expenses, purchases of new gear
and capital, and dockage rental and utility expenses. In addition to expenditure information, vessel
owners were asked to report the number of days that the vessel was used during the year for both
fishing and chartering activities, and for non-fishing activities. There are 126 observations available
for 2005-06.
Annual repair and maintenance expenses, gear and capital replacement costs, and dockage and
utility expenses are summed and are hereafter referred to as vessel maintenance costs (VMC).
Investigation reveals that reported VMC’s vary with the size of the vessel, measured by vessel
length in feet, and the total days at sea (all uses). The following model of VMC is estimated with
ordinary least squares regression:17
lnVMC= −5.761 + 1.647 · ln len + 0.443 · lnDAS
(1.367) (0.433) (0.098)
(3)
The results in equation 3 predict that VMC for a typical vertical line gear vessel, at 35 feet
in length and 110 days at sea is $8,810 per year. A 45 foot vessel, which is the typical length for
a longline gear boat, that spends 130 days at sea per year is expected to incur annual operating
expenses of $14,360. To gain perspective on the magnitude of these expenses, we calculate the added
costs per pound for the cost eﬃcient fleet as defined above. A representative vertical line gear boat
16The focus on variable expences facilitates comparison of costs and eﬀort incurred by sample vessels and by the
cost eﬃcient fleet structure. Note that part time reef fish vessels incur annual maintanence, docking and utility
expenses. What is not clear is which portion of these annual operating expenses should be allocated to reef fish
fishing.
17The log-log specification fit the data best. The R-squared statistic for the model is 0.370. Alternative specifica-
tions and additional regressors (e.g., gear type, crew size, 2005 dummy variable) were considered and rejected.
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harvests 60,000 pounds of reef fish annually (3,000 per trip and 20 trips a year). Estimated VMC
thus adds $0.147 per harvested pound. Longline vessels in the cost eﬃcient fleet land 8,000 pounds
per trip and take 16 trips per year, which implies annual harvest of 128,000 pounds. Calculations
reveal that VMC expenses add $0.112 per pound of reef fish. Combining these costs with the RAVC
estimates reported in tables 4 and 7 suggests a cost advantage for the longline gear type. This cost
advantage is explored further below.
A final cost incurred by reef fish fishermen is the purchase price of the fishing vessel. Commercial
fishing boats represent a significant capital investment and are specific in the sense that they have
few alternative uses in the economy and discretely lower values when employed in these alternative
uses. An initial investment in a fishing boat must be recouped over its productive life. The specific
nature of the investment and the uncertainty faced by fishermen (both production and regulatory
uncertainty) suggest a relatively high required rate of return is appropriate to calculate an annual
rental price for a fishing vessel. Unfortunately, our data do not contain vessel value information.
Consequently, net profit calculations reported below will be interpreted as returns to all fixed
factors, which in the case of a fishery, include the sum of rent to the fish stock and the rent to
vessel capital employed in the fishery.
5 Fleet structure, costs and rent under IFQs
Results reported in the previous section indicate that economies of scale and cost (pure technical)
eﬃciency gains are unexploited under the current controlled access management program in the
Gulf grouper fishery. Incentive to exploit these economies under IFQ management suggests that
the reef fish harvest will be consolidated onto fewer, cost eﬃcient vessels, and that some boat will
exit the fishery. An examination of the pattern of vessel exit en route to the IFQ-regime fleet
structure equilibrium is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we focus on characterizing the
equilibrium fleet structure, total fleet eﬀort and harvesting cost predicted in equilibrium under IFQ
management.
With IFQs, vessel operations will no longer be constrained by catch limits and seasonal closures.
Catch per vessel during a fishing season will be constrained instead by the quantity of harvest
permits held, by weather conditions, or possibly mechanical failure. To characterize the fleet
structure that will emerge under the IFQ system, we require an estimate of the annual harvest that
could be achieved by representative vessels. This estimate is determined as the cost eﬃcient catch
per trip identified above, times the trips taken per year. Our approach is to examine past data on
days spent at sea by vessels operating in the reef fish fishery. We then calculate annual trips and
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annual harvest per boat.
Figure 1: Annual Days at Sea in the Eastern Gulf Reef Fish Fishery (2003-06). Left hand panels
report days at sea for vertical line gear boats from 2003 (top panel) through 2006 (bottom panel). Right
hand panels report days at sea for longline gear boats from 2003 (top panel) through 2006 (bottom panel).
Figure 1 plots annual days at sea for vertical line and longline gear vessels that took a significant
component of their annual days at sea (at least 25%) in the eastern Gulf reef fish fishery. The data
are reported for 2003 in the top panels of the figure, through 2006 in the bottom panels of the
figure. Left hand panels plot days at sea for primarily vertical line gear vessels (75% of DAS used
vertical line gear). Right hand panels plot days for longline gear vessels (75% of DAS used longline
gear).
Results for vertical line gear boats (left hand panels) indicate that over 45% of participating
vessels fished less than 20 days per year during 2003-06. As noted previously, the vertical line fleet
includes a significant number of part time vessel operations. These boats take a small number of
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Mixed Fleet
Gear DWG SWG Snp./Oth. Bts. Trips DAS RAC Rev. Cost Rent
Vert. 0.150m 2.957m 3.685m 148 2,590 17,728 $0.94 $17.636m $2.990m $14.646m
Long. 1.310m 5.843m 1.990m 85 1,332 12,676 $0.75 $23.809 $3.603 $20.206
Total 1.460m 8.800m 5.675m 233 3,922 30,404 $0.83 $41.445 $6.593 $34.852
All Longline Fleet
Gear DWG SWG Snp./Oth. Bts. Trips DAS RAC Rev. Cost Rent
Long. 1.460m 8.800m 5.675m 146 2,304 21,915 $0.71 $41.193m $4.401m $36.793m
Table 9: IFQ Fleet Structure, Eﬀort and Rent. SWG combines red, gag and other
shallow water grouper species. Snp./Oth. combines snappers, other reef fish and
non-reef fish species. Total allowable catch levels are in millions of pounds,
gutted weight. Mixed fleet results allocate 52.5% of total pounds to vertical
line gear, and 47.5% to longline gear.
trips and harvest small quantities of reef fish each year. Active vertical line gear boats, on the other
hand, regularly fish for over 100 days per year and some boats spend over 150 or more days at sea
per year fishing for reef fish.
Results for longline gear boats indicate a larger proportion of the fleet are active vessels that fish
for considerably more days annually. As indicated in the figure, it is not uncommon for longline
gear boats to spend 150-200 days at sea annually. The data indicate the presence of part time
operations, although the number of vessels in this category is much smaller than for vertical line
boats.
Results in Figure 1 are suggestive of the time that vessels will fish under IFQs.18 It is assumed
that vertical line gear boats will fish for 120 days annually, and longline gear vessels will fish 150
days per year under an IFQ management program. These assumptions are used below to determine
the annual number of trips and, correspondingly, the total pounds harvested per vessel each year.19
Table 9 reports estimates of fleet size, eﬀort, revenue, cost and the rent to fixed factors that are
predicted under the IFQ equilibrium as described in Section 2. Total grouper quotas are assumed
to follow current TAC levels. A scenario considering a reduced gag and increased red grouper
18Days at sea data reported in Figure 1 may have been influenced by seasonal closures that have been imposed for
grouper and tilefish since 2004 (Smith, et al., forthcoming).
19Annual operating costs for a vessel operation (Section 2) relate to trip-costs as follows: C(τh, , w, k, x) =
τc(h,w, k, x) + VMC, where c(h,w, k, x) includes per trip labor expenses.
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quota is examined below. The DWG quota (which includes tilefish) is set to 1.460 million pounds
gutted weight (1.02 million pounds for deep water grouper and 440,000 pounds for tilefish); the
SWG quota, which includes red, gag and other shallow water grouper species, is set at 8.800 million
pounds. The SWG quota is divided into a red grouper quota of 5.31 million pounds, a gag grouper
quota of 2.810 million pounds, and an other grouper species quota of 680,000 pounds.
It is clear that reef fish fishermen operating under an IFQ management program will continue to
intercept and land snapper species, other reef fish species and non-reef fish species. The proposed
grouper IFQ program design includes tradable harvest permits for grouper and tilefish species only.
To approximate the IFQ-regime conditions, Table 9 assumes that the fleetwide harvest of Snp./Oth.
species will equal the total catch for these species reported in the 2006 log book data on trips that
landed groupers. It should be emphasized that this assumption does not imply that the actual
harvest of these species will remain unchanged if managed outside the umbrella of the grouper IFQ
program (see Weninger 2004 for further discussion).
The results in the table assume representative vertical line vessels which are 35 feet in length
and carry a crew of two. Vertical line boats are assumed to harvest 3,000 pounds per trip and take
roughly 18 trips per year on average. The annual number of trips is obtained as the assumed total
days at sea, 120 for vertical line gear, divided by estimated trip length.
Representative longline vessels are assumed to be 45 feet in length, with a crew of three. These
boats are assumed to harvest 8,000 pounds per trip and take 16 trips per year, where trips per year
are calculated similarly, as annual days at sea (150) divided by the estimated trip length. The crew
wage is set at $112 per day for vertical line gear boats and $141 per day for longline gear boats,
which are the 2006 median wages from our sample data. Fuel and dockside prices are set at the
2006 sample averages for the respective gear types.
The results in the top half of the table consider a mixed fleet made up of both vertical line and
longline gear types. For this scenario, total quotas are allocated to the two gear types in the same
proportions that are indicated in the 2006 logbook data.
The results indicate that the equilibrium mixed fleet will include 233 vessels, 148 vertical line
boats and 85 longline boats. Total trips are estimated to be 3,922. Vertical line boats allocate
more days at sea even though they harvest a smaller share of the fleet-wide catch.20 Vertical line
gear attains RAC of $0.94, whereas longline gear attains RAC of $0.77 per pound. The weighted
average RAC for the mixed fleet is $0.83. Total fleet revenues are $41.445 million. Total fleet costs
are predicted to be $6.593 million, which implies an annual rent to vessel capital and the reef fish
20Total crew days at sea are easily calculated as two times the total days at sea for vertical line boats and three
times total days at sea for longline boats.
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resource of $34.852 million.
These numbers suggest that considerable rent is available in the reef fish fishery under a stream-
lined fleet that exploits available economies of scale and cost (pure technical) eﬃciency. The model
predicts the streamlined IFQ fleet could attain RAC in the range of $0.83 per landed pound. Aver-
age dockside prices for groupers are in the range of $1.95 for deepwater groupers (vertical line gear)
to $2.81 for gag groupers (longline gear). This suggests per-pound rent to fixed factors in the range
of $1.12 to $1.98 per pound. The grouper quota exceeds 12 million pounds (round weight) which
implies rent for grouper species alone in the range of $13.44 million to $23.76 million annually.
Adding to this the rent from snappers, other reef fish and non-reef fish species pushes the total rent
estimate to almost $35 million annually.
The analysis in Section 4 indicated a cost advantage for longline gear. Vertical line vessels
that cannot match the costs attained on longline boats will find quota ownership costly and will
face incentives to either switch gear types or exit the fishery. The model predicts that harvesting
permits will gravitate to the hands of longline gear vessel operators. Results in the bottom half
of Table 9 assume a fleet comprised exclusively of longline boats. Under a longline only fleet, 146
boats will be active and 2,304 trips will be required to harvest the reef fish quota. Fleet-wide RAC
is predicted to fall to $0.71 per pound.21 Revenues (which are evaluated at the average dockside
prices for respective vessel types) are $41.193 million. Costs under the exclusively longline vessel
fleet are lower than under the mixed fleet by roughly $2 million, and the model predicts annual
rent to fixed factors at $36.793 million.
Further calculations provide an estimate of the cost savings that are expected under the IFQ
management program. Due to diﬃculties in accounting for maintenance cost savings, only variable
cost savings are reported.
Analysis of the sample data indicates that the actual RAVC incurred under controlled access
management is $0.90 per pound for vertical line gear and $0.72 per pound for longline gear. Results
suggest that costs will fall under IFQs to $0.75 and to $0.62 per pound, respectively, for the two
gear types. Extrapolating these savings to the total round weight quotas from Table 9 indicates
variable cost savings in the range of $2.226 million per year under the mixed fleet structure scenario,
and $3.236 million per year under the longline only fleet scenario. From the predicted fleet sizes
reported in Table 9, it is clear that variable costs savings alone will underestimate the total cost
savings expected under the proposed IFQ management program. Maintenance cost savings could
be substantial as the active reef fish fleet downsizes from current levels to those reported in the
21Recall that harvesting costs are a function of total pounds harvested, as well as the mix of individual species.
The model suggests that longline RAC is lower at the species mix implied under the longline only fleet scenario.
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Mixed Fleet
Gear DWG SWG Snp./Oth. Bts. Trips DAS RAC Rev. Cost Rent
Vert. 0.150m 2.257m 3.685m 77 2,314 15,843 $0.82 $15.298m $2.387m $12.912m
Long. 1.310m 5.393m 1.990m 132 1,266 12,044 $0.77 $22.105m $3.618m $18.487m
Total 1.460m 7.650m 5.675m 209 3,580 27,887 $0.79 $37.403m $6.005m $31.399m
All Longline Fleet
Gear DWG SWG Snp./Oth. Bts. Trips DAS RAC Rev. Cost Rent
Long. 1.460m 7.650m 5.675m 135 2,134 20,301 $0.74 $37.101m $4.331m $32.770m
Table 10: IFQ Fleet Structure, Eﬀort and Rent. SWG includes red, gag and other
shallow water grouper species. Snp./Oth. includes snappers, other reef fish and
non-reef fish species. Total allowable catch levels are in millions of pounds,
gutted weight. Mixed fleet results allocate 41.2% of TAC’s to vertical line gear
and 58.8% to longline gear.
table. Logbook data indicate that 489 vessels reported reef fish landings in the eastern Gulf region
of the reef fish fishery in 2006 (Table 1 in Section 3). As noted, many of these vessels are part
time operations. Nonetheless, the extent of the fleet downsizing that is predicted by the model is
substantial.
A final consideration is the expected trading price for tradable harvest permits under the IFQ
management program. Current dockside prices for the various reef fish species and RAC estimates
reported in Table 9 indicate roughly the per-pound profits that are available under IFQ manage-
ment. For the mixed fleet scenario RAC is estimated at $0.83. This suggests per pound profits in the
range of $1.23 for deep water groupers and tilefish, to $1.95 per pound for gag grouper. Recall that
the above cost estimates do not include a rental price for vessel capital. Bargaining arrangements
between permit owners and fishermen will also be an important determinant of actual permit lease
prices. With these caveats in mind, the model suggests that grouper permit lease prices in excess
of $1.00 per pound could be observed under IFQ management. The perpetual ownership price for
quota will be impacted by numerous factors (see Newel et al., 2005 for additional discussion).
Table 10 reports results under alternative assumptions for total harvest quotas in the fishery.
In this second scenario the annual quotas for deepwater groupers and tilefish, and the assumed
harvest of snappers, other reef fish and non-reef fish are unchanged from above. The SWG quota
is reduced from 8.800 million to 7.650 million pounds, gutted weight. This adjustment embeds an
increase in the red grouper quota from 5.310 million to 6.785 million pounds, and a reduction in
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the gag quota from 2.810 million to 1.220 million pounds. The adjustments to the annual red and
gag grouper quotas are currently being considered by regulators (Amendment 30, Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council).
The results in the table are as expected: the reduced shallow water grouper quota results
in smaller equilibrium fleet sizes, less eﬀort, lower revenue and lower total costs. Note that the
reduction in fleet cost is not as pronounced as the reduction in fleet size and fishing eﬀort. For the
mixed gear fleet scenario, vessels and trips are predicted to decline by roughly 10.3%. Total cost
is predicted to fall by 8.9%. The explanation for this result is the added targeting costs required
by longline gear vessels to harvest the mix of SWG species under the adjusted quota scenario. In
particular, a sharp reduction in the gag quota combined with an increase in the red grouper quota
will move the regulated harvest mix further from the cost-minimizing mix. As indicated in the
table this unbalanced quota raises RAC for longline gear.
This result has important policy implications. First, a total quota mix that is more in line with
current stock levels may save targeting costs for the fleet, and may represent a preferred alternative
for managers. Second, the model indicates that adjustments in total quotas have diﬀerential impacts
on gear types. Notice that RAC for vertical line boats is predicted to decline under the adjusted
SWG quotas. This result highlights the fact that harvesting costs which include targeting costs,
diﬀer across the two gear types and that adjustments to the mix of harvested species aﬀects costs
and profitability diﬀerently. The model shows that RAC, fleet structure and ultimately total rent
generated under the IFQ management program is impacted by the mix of total harvest targets
chosen by the fishery manager. Singh and Weninger (2007) present a general analysis and discussion
of optimal harvest policies in IFQ-managed multiple species fisheries.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates multiple-species trip-level harvesting costs for vertical line and longline gear
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery. The cost function that is estimated
provides a comprehensive and intuitive characterization of harvesting activities in the fishery. The
empirical model is used to predict the fleet structure, fishery-wide eﬀort levels, per vessel harvest
activity, revenues and total fleet harvest costs that are expected under a proposed IFQ management
program for groupers and tilefish. The results suggest that significant fleet downsizing will occur
and considerable harvest cost savings will emerge under the proposed IFQ program. Cost savings
are due to pure cost eﬃciency gains as the tradable harvest permits gravitate toward the most
eﬃcient vessels in the fleet and to economies of scale. Remaining vessels are expected to fully
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utilize their vessel capital, i.e., take more trips per year and harvest more fish per boat, than under
the current controlled access management program. The predicted fleet downsizing will lead to
additional fixed cost savings (e.g., maintenance and docking fees). Lastly, the model predicts that
the share of the total reef fish catch that is currently harvested by longline gear vessels will increase.
Variable harvesting cost savings due to management reform are predicted in the range of $2.226
million to $3.236 million annually. The additional maintenance cost savings are diﬃcult to quantify,
but are expected to be significant. Overall, the results suggest that IFQs will generate significant
economic benefits relative to the current controlled access management program in the eastern Gulf
grouper fishery.
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7 Appendix
This appendix describes the econometric procedure used to estimate the parameters of the trip
level cost function in (1).
We first introduce some simplifying notation. Denote the cost for the t0th fishing trip as
c(θt, Zt) =
∙
1 +
1
2
γi (θt − ϕ)2
¸
exp [βZt] ,
= [At] exp[Bt] (A1)
where θt is the harvest share vector and Zt is a vector of trip-level conditioning variables:
Zt = [1, h1t...h7t, h21t...h
2
7t, (crewt · h1t)...(crewt · h7t), crew, crew2, trips, d05]
In the above, crewt denotes crew size including the skipper, trips is the total trips taken by the
vessel during the fishing season (proxy for pure technical eﬃciency), d05 is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 if the trip was taken during the 2005 fishing season and zero otherwise.
Log transforming equation A1 and adding an error term t,0 obtains
ln c(θt, Zt) = ln[At)] +Bt + t,0. (A2)
Necessary conditions for profit maximizing targeting behavior can be written as
ηpt,i = At,i exp[Bt] +AtBt,i exp[Bt] + t,i, i = 1, ...,m, (A3)
where At,i and Bt,i denote partial derivatives of At and Bt from equation A1 with respect to the
harvest of the i0th output, and t,i, .., t,m are iid random errors. Let 0 = (0,1, ..., 0,T )0 denote
the T × 1 error vector for the T observations in equation A2. Similarly, let i = (i,1, ..., i,T )0
i = 1, ...,M denote the T ×1 error vector for the i0th first order condition. Finally, let Γ = (γ, ϕ, β)
denote the unknown parameters of the model.
Γ is estimated with nonlinear weighted least squares. The function to be minimized is
0(Σ−1 ⊗ IT ), (A4)
where,  = (00, ..., m)0 is the TM × 1 vector of random errors, obtained by stacking error vectors.
A two step procedure is used to estimate Γ. In the first step, Σ is set equal to an m + 1
identity matrix. Denote this matrix as Σ(1). An initial estimate of Γ is obtained by minimizing A4
conditional on Σ(1). Denote this first step estimate as bΓ(1). Using bΓ(1), we calculate b = (b0, ...,bm)
from equations A2 and A3, and estimate the variance-covariance matrix bΣ = b0b/T . A final estimate
of bΓ is obtained by minimizing equation A4 conditional on bΣ.
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Variable Estimate St. Error Variable Estimate St. Error
Const. -2.086 0.032 h27 -0.038 0.002
h1 0.905 0.013 h1 · crew -0.078 0.004
h2 1.090 0.010 h2 · crew -0.186 0.003
h3 0.709 0.007 h3 · crew -0.055 0.002
h4 0.834 0.009 h4 · crew -0.082 0.002
h5 0.711 0.006 h5 · crew -0.016 0.002
h6 0.554 0.006 h6 · crew -0.061 0.002
h7 0.127 0.005 h7 · crew 0.067 0.000
h21 -0.123 0.001 crew 0.303 0.015
h22 -0.093 0.001 crew
2 -0.017 0.003
h23 -0.065 0.001 Pfuel 0.175 0.008
h24 -0.117 0.003 trips -0.011 0.0003
h25 -0.078 0.001 D2005 -0.117 0.006
h26 -0.032 0.001
Table 11: Vertical Line Gear Parameter Estimates: Non-Targeting Cost Component.
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Variable Estimate St. Error Variable Estimate St. Error
Const. -1.690 0.028 h27 -0.005 0.0004
h1 0.318 0.003 h1 · crew -0.026 0.001
h2 0.328 0.004 h2 · crew -0.019 0.001
h3 0.227 0.005 h3 · crew -0.058 0.001
h4 0.529 0.007 h4 · crew -0.065 0.002
h5 0.292 0.003 h5 · crew -0.045 0.001
h6 0.777 0.007 h6 · crew -0.182 0.002
h7 0.167 0.004 h7 · crew 0.039 0.001
h21 -0.013 0.0002 crew 0.324 0.014
h22 -0.020 0.0002 crew
2 -0.003 0.002
h23 0.001 0.0004 Pfuel 0.318 0.005
h24 -0.055 0.001 trips -0.003 0.0003
h25 -0.028 0.0003 D2005 0.048 0.004
h26 -0.036 0.001
Table 12: Long Line Gear Parameter Estimates: Non-Targeting Cost Component.
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